Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

Alan Trujillo and Sharon Trujillo v. Utah
Department of Trasportation; Ball, Ball and
Brosamer, Inc; and John Does I through X : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark J. Williams; Hanson, Eperson & Wallace; Attorneys for Appellee.
Gary B. Ferguson; Williams & Hunt; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Trujillo v. Utah Department of Trasportation, No. 980331 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1610

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ORIGINAL
DQCUM£ N T
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT 01$APPEALS
.A10
DOCKb
ALAN TRUJILLO and SHARON
TRUJILLO,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 970550

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; BALL, BALL &
BROSAMER, INC. a California
corporation; and JOHN DOES I
through X,
Priority No. 15
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL NO. 960907179 PI

GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants Alan Trujillo
and Sharon Trujillo
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
STEPHEN G. MORGAN (2315)
JOSEPH E. MINNOCK (6281)
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER, INC.
13 6 South Main Street, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

MARK J. WILLIAMS (34 94)
STEPHEN P. HORVAT (624 9)
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee Utah Department
Of Transportation
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

1-iLfcD
Utah Court of Aopeafe

JM26B98
Julia D'Alesandro
Cterk of the Court

Date
Case No.
UTAH SUPREME COURT/UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CHECKLIST FOR BRIEFS
CHECK TO SEE THAT THE RECORD HAS BEEN RETURNED
TIMELY FILING OF BRIEF
An untimely brief may be rejected under Rule 27(d). If a brief is untimely, a
motion under Rule 26 will be mandatory for permission to file a late brief.
CORRECT NUMBER OF COPIES
1. Supreme Court: 10 copies, one containing original signature
2. Court of Appeals: 8 copies, one containing original signature
3. Petition for Rehearing: 7 copies, one containing original signature
LENGTH
(Excluding Addendum)
1.
Appellant/Appellee: SO pages
3. Petition Rehearing: 15 pages
2.
Reply:
25 pages
4. Amicus/Intervenor 50 pages
SIZE AND BINDING
PRINTING REQUIREMENTS
1.
Proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text
and footnotes; monospacedtypefacemay not contain more than 10
characters per inch.
2.
Print on both sides of the page.
3.
Double-spaced; 1 % spacing is unacceptable.
4.
1" margin on all sides
COVER REQUIREMENTS
1.
Color:
Appellant or Petitioner: Blue
Amicus, Intervenor,Guardian:Green
Appellee or Respondent:Red
Petition for Rehearing:
Tan
Reply:
Gray
Response to Rehearing:
White
2.
Name of counsel and parties represented.
3.
Argument priority classification. (R. 29) (Appellee)
CONTENT REQUIREMENTS - IN ORDER STATED
List of all Parties.
Table of Contents with page references.
Table of Authorities.
Jurisdictional Statement. (Mandatory for Appellant)
Statement of Issues & Standard of Review (Mandatory for Appellant)
A.
Citation to record showing issue preserved in trial court; OR
B.
Statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in trial court.
Constitutional or statutory provisions.
Statement of Case. (Mandatory for Appellant)
Statement of Facts.
Summary of Argument.
Argument.
Conclusion.
Signature of counsel of record or party if pro se.
Proof of Service.
Addendum: Findings of fact; memorandum decision; final order; Court of Appeals
-'-•--- r — ^ r * ; A M r { J* "rvnt+A SManrtafnrv for Aooellant)

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ALAN TRUJILLO and SHARON
TRUJILLO,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 970550

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION; BALL, BALL &
BROSAMER, INC. a California
corporation; and JOHN DOES I
through X,
Priority No. 15
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, DISTRICT JUDGE
CIVIL NO. 960907179 PI

GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorney for Plaintiffs/
Appellants Alan Trujillo
and Sharon Trujillo
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
STEPHEN G. MORGAN (2315)
JOSEPH E. MINNOCK (6281)
MORGAN, MEYER & RICE
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
BALL, BALL & BROSAMER, INC.
13 6 South Main Street, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-7888

MARK J. WILLIAMS (3494)
STEPHEN P. HORVAT (624 9)
HANSON, EPPERSON & WALLACE
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellee Utah Department
Of Transportation
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

I.

UDOT IS IMMUNE UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION FROM CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
ITS CHOICE OF BARRELS OVER BARRIERS TO SEPARATE
TRAFFIC IN THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE
A.

B.

9

Utah law provides that fundamental highway
design decisions are immune from attack under
the discretionary function exception to the waiver
of governmental immunity

11

UDOT's choice of barrels to provide traffic
separation constitutes the exercise of a
discretionary function

13

1.

2.

3.

4.

The four-factor test shows that the choice to
use barrels is covered by the discretionary
function immunity

13

Discretionary function immunity is proper
regardless of whether UDOT consulted
written studies

15

Immunity is not precluded by the lack of
documentation that the barrels-versusbarriers choice was discussed at multiple
levels

17

There was no regulation requiring the
use of barriers in the construction zone . . .

21

•l-

5.

6.
C.

II

UDOT is entitled to discretionary function
immunity because policy factors supported
its decision to use barrels

22

The choice to use barrels was not merely
an "operational" decision

24

Because UDOT is immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception, it is
irrelevant whether UDOT made the "right" choice
regarding the barrels

PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEIR INJURIES
RESULTED FROM UDOT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REDUCE THE
SPEED LIMITS IN THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE

26

27

CONCLUSION

30

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

31

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980)

23

Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 1992)

2

Carroll v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496
P.2d 888 (1972)

23

Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832, 835
(Utah 1992)

12

Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995)
10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 27
Little v. Utah State Div. Of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51
(Utah 1983)
Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996)

...

11
23, 25

Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997)

2

Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459
(Utah 1989)

12, 23

State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980)

29, 30

Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996)
Transamerica v. Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water,
Inc. , 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990)

29

1

Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992) . . 1

United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)

19

United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984) . .

19

Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1993)

18

Mvslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1986)
16

-iii-

Sea-Land Service v. United States, 919 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1990)
:

18

Statutes and Rules
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8

2,9

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1)

1, 2, 9, 10, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 63-49-4(4)

24

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (j)

1

-iv-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that the

decision made by UDOT to utilize barrels

instead

of

concrete

barriers for traffic separation as part of its Traffic Control Plan
was a discretionary act, rendering UDOT immune from suit under the
discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1).

II.

R. 413-423, 912-919, 1033-1035.

Whether the plaintiffs' allegation that UDOT negligently

failed to reduce the speed limit in the construction zone require
reversal of the order granting UDOT summary judgment, where the
plaintiffs did not produce any evidence showing that the speed
limit had any relationship to the accident.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party
is, nevertheless, entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Warren

v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992); Transamerica
v. Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25
-1-

(Utah 1990) .

The Utah Supreme Court reviews for correctness the

legal conclusions of the trial court.
1251

Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d

(Utah 1997); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102

(Utah

1992) .

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1993 repl. vol.)
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10,
immunity from suit is waived for any injury caused by a
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition, of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on
them.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1993 repl. vol.)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or
not the discretion is abused;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee UDOT adopts appellants' statement of the case insofar
as it sets forth the nature of the case, the course of proceedings,
and the disposition in the court below.

-2-

Pursuant to appellate rule

24(b)(1), UDOT submits only an additional "statement of facts."
This action arose from a head-on collision that occurred on
Interstate 84 in Weber County on September 24, 1995, when a westbound pickup truck driven by Scott Griffin crossed over the center
line and

collided with

vehicle.

R. 389-390.

the plaintiffs' eastbound

recreational

The accident took place at approximately

milepost 108, in a construction zone.
accident, the plaintiffs were injured.

Id.

As a result of the

R. 390.

At the time the accident occurred, 1-84 was being resurfaced
under federally funded State Project IM-84-6(70)102 in an area
approximately from milepost 102 to approximately milepost 112, for
a length of just over ten miles.

R. 425.

In connection with the

project, UDOT had to completely reconstruct both eastbound and
westbound sides of the Interstate.

R. 408, 1826-28.

While one

side was being rebuilt, the traffic was routed on the opposite
side, requiring a two-way two-lane operation ("TWTLO").

R. 408.

The UDOT design team, in accordance with Federal Regulations
and Guidelines set forth in Roadside Design Guide of the American
Association
("AASHTO")

of
and

State
the

Highway

Manual

on

and

Transportation

Uniform

Traffic

Code

Officials
Devices

("MUTCD"), considered the best way of separating the opposing lanes
of traffic.

The initial Traffic Control Plan design was drafted by

Jim Thompson, Design Engineer, Bruce Swenson, UDOT Regional and
Design Engineer, and supervisor Mr. Thompson. R. 1817, 1818, 1822,
-3-

1826.

This plan was

considered

ultimately decided upon.

in multiple

reviews

and

was

R. 409.

As with all proposed road projects, UDOT undertakes a detailed
process in designing, reviewing and approving traffic controlled
design for construction projects. This process was followed in the
drafting,
project.

formulation

and

approval

of

the plans

for the

1-84

In connection with UDOT's preparation and drafting of its

preliminary design plans for 1-84 construction project, an initial
preliminary

meeting,

called

the

Scoping

determine the parameters of the project.

Meeting,

was

held

to

The Scoping Meeting for

1-84 was held on or about July 16, 1993.

Those in attendance

include Federal Highway Administration officials, UDOT maintenance,
engineering, design and administrative personnel, and affected City
and County officials.
safety

issues

on

the

R. 410, 448-52, 1858-59, 1910-13.
construction

project

were

General

discussed

hazards were identified during this Scoping meeting.

and

Id.

Additional studies, including level of service and traffic
volumes, were made by UDOT during January 1994. R. 410.

Following

the initial Scoping meeting the preliminary draft of the plans was
prepared, and a "plan-in-hand" review was held on the project on or
about June 22, 1994.

Again, various representatives from UDOT as

well as Federal Highway Administration attended this meeting.
411, 108-09, 463-70, 1886-87, 1898.

R.

Following the plan-in-hand

meeting, comments of the group were addressed and quantities for
-4-

the project were calculated by the same group of engineers and UDOT
representatives.

R. at 412, 462-70, 1898-1900.

These reviews were followed by a PS&E Meeting (Plans, Special
Provisions and Estimates) wherein the plans, special provisions and
estimates were reviewed page-by-page. The same number of engineers
were involved in this process as well.

R. at 412, 1914-16.

completion of the PS&E Meeting, a final review was done.
of the plans were then distributed:

After

Two sets

one plan went to the Division

of Safety, and one to the project engineer to ensure that they
concurred with all aspects of the plans.

(R. at 412, 1915.)

Federal Highway Administration representatives were involved
from the very beginning, including Tom Allen and Don Kilmore.
Three Federal Highway Engineers reviewed the 1-84 project before it
sent out to bid.

Once it was completed, the Federal Highway Admin-

istration signed off on the project to allow to go out for advertisement for bid.

It is not possible to have a federally funded

project, which this was, to go out for bid unless there has been
federal approval.

R. at 412, 482, 1916-18.

In designing the project, UDOT looked to MUTCD, the standard
of the industry.

Under Part VI, Standards and Guides for Traffic

Controls for Street and Highway Construction, Maintenance, Utility,
and

Incident

Management

Operations

(1988 edition, Revision 3,

September 3, 1993), certain issues must be reviewed in order to
determine whether a TWTLO should be included in a traffic control
-5-

plan.

R. 420-21, 438-46.

When maintained on a roadway of a

normally divided highway, the MUTCD requires that opposing traffic
be separated "either with portable barriers (concrete safety-shape
or approved alternate), or with channelizing devices throughout the
length of the TLTWO."

R. 421, 442.

Barrels are considered proper

channelizing devises which can be used at the discretion of highway
departments, including UDOT.

R. at 421, 22, 72-73.)

There are many reasons why barrels may be chosen instead of
barriers for a highway construction project.

In fact, while there

are many reasons to use barriers, there are just as many reasons
not to use them.

Barriers reduce a driver's recovery area, making

accidents more

likely.

vehicles

getting

from

beginning and end.

Furthermore, barriers preclude emergency
to

the

other

side.

They

also

have a

These require attenuators which can be hit and

cause substantial collision.

Barriers also retain water and keep

it from running off roadways, which can cause icy conditions in
cold weather.

They also create canyon-like effects, reducing the

margin for error even further.
difficult to move.

They are also more costly and more

It is significant to note that the Federal

Highway Administration, who approved and funded the project, never
required barriers or asked that they be considered.

R. 1992-96,

2005.
Plaintiffs' own expert, Thomas Alcorn, admitted that he had no
way to determine what caused the truck driver to veer off to the
-6-

right of the road before he then lost control and crossed over the
center line to cause the accident.

When asked if he would admit

that he would "merely be speculating . . . that speed was one of
the factors that caused him to drive off the shoulder", Mr. Alcorn
stated as follows:
A.
A little more than speculation.
It's very
characteristic of our highways throughout the country as
a causal factor in single vehicle, run-off-the-road
accidents on the outside of a curb.
Q.

But you're making a general statement, correct?

A.

Yes.

Q.
And it's not based on any particular facts or
investigation in this case?
A.

I agree.

R. at 2269-70.)

-7-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly granted UDOT summary judgment on the
basis of discretionary function immunity for its decision to use
barrels as the traffic separation method in the construction zone.
This decision was arrived at after weighing several policy factors.
The plaintiffs

allege that UDOT should have utilized

concrete

barriers instead, but barriers themselves carry significant risks
of

their own, and UDOT's personnel

barrels were the preferred method.
decision

the discretionary

function

decided

that, on balance,

This is exactly the sort of
exception was

intended

to

protect.
In a recent case, the Utah Supreme Court held that UDOT' s
choice as to the height

of a concrete median barrier was protected

by discretionary function immunity.

But if the choice as to the

height of the barrier is discretionary, then so too is the choice
as to whether to use a barrier in the first place.
The plaintiffs have raised several minor arguments as to why
the discretionary function immunity exception does not apply in
this case.

But these arguments are uniformly meritless.

The

Governmental

Immunity Act does not require that the government

agency consult specific written studies in making its decision.
Nor does the Act require the government to provide evidence that
all aspects of the specific question were discussed at the highest-8-

level meetings.
nature

of

Rather, discretionary immunity depends on

the decision being made, and whether

involves the weighing of policy considerations.

that

the

decision

Further, UDOT did

not have any regulations requiring the use of concrete barriers,
and the choice to use barrels cannot be dismissed as a merely
"operational" decision, carrying
construct

the

freeway.

out

the

"policy"

Finally, because

decision to

the decision not to

initially use barriers was discretionary, so too was the decision
not to install those barriers after the project began.
The court was also correct in granting summary judgment on the
claim that UDOT allegedly negligently failed to reduce the speed
limit in the construction zone.

There was no evidence that the

speed limit had anything to do with the accident at issue.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
UDOT IS IMMUNE UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION FROM
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM ITS CHOICE OF BARRELS OVER
BARRIERS TO SEPARATE TRAFFIC IN THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE.
Section 63-3 0-8 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides
that

government

entities

are

immune

from

suit

for

allegedly

defective highways if "the injury arises out of one or more of the
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10."
Ann. § 63-30-8.

Utah Code

Section 63-30-10 further provides that immunity is

not waived "if the injury arises out of:
-Q-

[%] (1) the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function, whether or not the discretion is abused."
§ 63-30-10(1)
injuries

(1993 repl. vol.). 1

allegedly

resulted

from

Utah Code Ann.

In our case, the plaintiffs'
UDOT's

use

of

barrels

as

channelizing devices in its traffic control plan for the Weber
Canyon Freeway Reconstruction Project.

This decision obviously

arose out of the exercise of a discretionary function.

Therefore,

UDOT is immune from suit, and the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

adopted

a

four-part

test

to

determine whether a decision or act qualifies for the discretionary
function exception:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program,
or objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission or decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that
policy, program or objective as opposed to one which
would not change the course or direction of the policy,
program or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and
expertise on the part of the governmental agency
involved?
(4) Does the government agency involved possess
requisite authority to make the act or omission?

1

the

Section 63-30-10 was amended in 1996. It now provides that
immunity is not waived for an injury that "arises out of, in
connection
with,
or resulting
from" the exercise of a discretionary
function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1997 repl. vol.).
-10-

Keeaan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995) (quoting Little v.
Utah State Div. Of Family Servs. , 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983)).
The decision to choose barrels rather than concrete barriers as a
channelizing method was an exercise of UDOT's discretion, because
the

decision

required

the

weighing

of

several

considerations

involving safety and other important policy matters.
faced

with

a difficult

choice

between

two

traffic

methods, each of which posed its own dangers.
responsibility to make that choice.

UDOT was
separation

It was UDOT's

And once it made that choice,

its decision should not be second-guessed.

A.

Utah law provides that fundamental highway design
decisions are immune from attack under the discretionary
function exception to the waiver of governmental
immunity.

In a recent case remarkably similar to our own, the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that UDOT's decisions regarding highway
barrier design are discretionary functions which may not form the
basis

for governmental

liability.

Keegan, 896 P. 2d 618.

In

Keecran, the plaintiff's husband was killed on 1-80 in Parley's
Canyon when his car skidded on black ice, climbed the concrete
median barrier, and slid along the barrier, crashing into a bridge
support pillar.

The plaintiff alleged that although the concrete

barrier had originally been built in compliance with the relevant
safety

standards, two

subsequent

surface

overlay projects had

raised the road level, effectively reducing the height of the
-11-

barrier to below the standard.

The supreme court held that UDOT's

decision not to raise the barrier during the overlay projects was
discretionary, and that the trial court had erred in denying UDOT's
summary judgment motion.
The court explained that all four of the elements set forth
above were
barrier.
tive:

satisfied

by UDOT's decision

to keep

the

concrete

First, the decision involved a "basic governmental objec-

to wit, public safety on the roads."

Id. at 624. The court

noted that a safety studies engineer had concluded that not raising
the barrier would not have an adverse impact on safety.

Second,

the decision was essential to the realization of that policy, as
the decision "involved a determination of not only the degree of
safety that would be provided by the various options considered,
but also what degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given
time and cost constraints."

Id.

Third, the decision involved the

exercise of basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency. And
fourth, UDOT had the authority to make the decision.
Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d

832, 835

See also

(Utah 1992)

(decision not to upgrade warning devices at dangerous railroad
crossing was immune as discretionary because the decision involved
weighing competing policy concerns); Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt
Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463

(Utah 1989)

(design of City Creek

flood control system discretionary because it required evaluation
of a myriad of factors).
-12-

B.

UDOT's choice of barrels to provide traffic separation
constitutes the exercise of a discretionary function.
1.

The four-factor test shows that the choice to use
barrels is covered by the discretionary function
immunity.

Keegan controls our case.
height

of

a

concrete

If UDOT's decision regarding the

barrier

constitutes

the

exercise

of

a

discretionary function, then so does the decision whether to use a
concrete barrier in the first place.

Further, the four-element

test is also satisfied, for the same reasons as in Keegan.

The

choice of the proper traffic separation method in our case involved
the same policy objective as in Keegan:
first element is met.

highway safety.

Thus, the

Moreover, just as in Keegan, the second

element of the test is satisfied because the decision was essential
to the realization of that policy.

That is, UDOT's decision to use

barrels clearly "involved a determination of . . . the degree of
safety that would be provided by the various options considered."
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624.
The third element is met because the decision involved UDOT's
basic policy judgment and expertise. As explained in the statement
of facts, the Traffic Control Plan was evaluated in great detail by
committees of UDOT personnel and was reviewed by federal highway
experts.

Such evaluation happened on various levels, through the

initial scoping meeting, the preliminary drafting of the plan, the
Plan-in-Hand Meeting, the PS&E meeting, and the final review of
-13-

plans.

At all levels of this intensive process, the people and

committees utilized their judgment and expertise, and applied broad
policy factors in arriving at the final plan for the resurfacing of
1-84, including the Traffic Control Plan.

Fourth, UDOT obviously-

had the authority to make the decision, as it did in Keegan.
In fact, the argument for discretionary function immunity is
actually more

compelling in our case than in Keegan.

In Keegan,

there were no safety reasons favoring the use of the inadequate
barrier.

Thus, the choice in that case came down to safety versus

money and inconvenience.

But in our case, not only would barriers

have increased the cost and inconvenience, but UDOT also had to
weigh safety

considerations on both sides of the equation.

Barriers increase the risk of accidents in several ways.

A

barrier severely limits a driver's "recovery area," so a driver who
swerves a few feet will most likely hit the barrier, which is a
"rather significant collision."

Deposition of David Kennison, R.

1993:23 - 1994:18. Without barriers, however, a driver may be able
to recorrect and to return to the proper lane of travel.

Id.

Additionally, because a barrier was already in place on the righthand side of one of the travel lanes, putting another barrier in
the middle would have created a "canyon" effect in that lane. This
would have increased the risk of accidents even more, as it would
have left very little room for error on either
1995:4-10, 2005:13-24.

side.

Id. R.

Barriers on both sides also increase the
-14-

likelihood of a major pileup after an accident.

Id. 1995:8-10.

Further, one can imagine the havoc that even one stalled vehicle
could wreak if all the traffic in one direction were channeled into
one lane with barrier on both sides.
Barriers can pose other hazards as well.

As demonstrated by

Keegan itself, vehicles can climb up onto barriers, and fatalities
can result.

Barriers can even cause some vehicles to roll over.

Swenson Deposition, R. 1824:25 - 1825:8.

Further, barriers must

have a beginning and an end, and they can require attenuators that
can cause accidents. Kennison Deposition, R. 1994:22-25. Barriers
reduce water's ability to run off, which can create icy conditions
in cold weather.

Id. R. 1995:1-3. Once again, Keegan demonstrates

the potential consequences of such a situation.

Finally, barriers

interfere with the ability of emergency vehicles to reach the scene
of an accident, which can further increase the risks to drivers and
passengers.

2.

Id. R. 1994:19 - 22; Swenson Deposition R. 1826:8-13.

Discretionary
regardless of
studies.

function
immunity
is
whether UDOT consulted

proper
written

The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Keegan by claiming that
UDOT did not use written safety reports in its determination as to
whether to use barrels or barriers as a traffic separation method.
But

this contention

fails.

First, UDOT

did

consider

written

accident reports, traffic studies, etc., in creating and deciding

-15-

upon the Traffic Control Plan.

Level of service and traffic volume

studies were made and considered, R. 454-59, as was an Operational
Safety Report.

R. 461.

But more importantly, the Governmental

Immunity Act does not require written studies for the discretionary
function exception to apply. Government employees make hundreds of
discretionary decisions every year, and certainly not all of these
decisions are supported by written studies.
The question under the Act is whether the plaintiffs' injuries
arose out of the exercise of a discretionary function, not what
particular

materials

were

performing that function.
cases

that

would

allow

used

by

the governmental

entity

in

And the plaintiffs have not cited any
them

to get

around

the

discretionary

function immunity by claiming that the decisionmaking process was
inadequate.

Further, to allow the plaintiffs to do so here would

eviscerate the discretionary function exception.
The whole purpose of the discretionary function exception is
to protect legislative and administrative policy decisions from
second-guessing

by the judicial

system;

this purpose would be

thwarted if the materials used in the decisionmaking itself
subject to such attack.

were

For instead of arguing that a decision was

negligent, plaintiffs could simply argue that the decisionmaking
was negligent.
94,

97

(6th

discretionary

See, e.g., Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d
Cir.

1986)

government

("even

the

policymaker
-16-

negligent
to

consider

failure
all

of

a

relevant

aspects of a subject matter under consideration does not vitiate
the discretionary character of the decision that was made").
3.

Immunity is not precluded by the lack of
documentation that the barrels-versus-barriers
choice was discussed at multiple levels.

Plaintiffs further claim that Keegan cannot apply because UDOT
does not have documentary evidence that the barriers-versus-barrels
decision itself was specifically evaluated at several UDOT levels.
However, the traffic separation method was an essential part of the
Traffic Control Plan, and as established above, the entire Plan was
carefully evaluated, reviewed, and approved at several UDOT levels,
that no one raised an objection to the use of barrels does not mean
that no one considered the issue.
Further, the plaintiffs have not presented any authority
requiring a government entity to provide evidence that every aspect
of a discretionary decision was specifically discussed.
federal cases hold to the contrary:

And

as long as the decision is of

a discretionary type, courts will not weigh the adequacy of the
discussions actually made about that decision.

For example, in a

case quoted with approval in Keegan, the Fourth Circuit explained
that "rather than requiring a fact-based inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the government actor's exercise of a particular
discretionary function, we are of opinion [sic] that a reviewing
court in the usual case is to look to the nature of the

-17-

challenged

decision

in an objective,

or general

decision is one which we would expect
of policy.11

considerations

sense,

and ask whether that

inherently

to be grounded

in

Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716,

720-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoted in Keegan, 896 P.2d
at

625).

The

Third

determining whether

Circuit

has

also

explained

the action of the government

that

" [i]n

involves the

permissible exercise of policy judgment, we need not examine the
record for evidence of a conscious policy decision . . . .

The

relevant inquiry is whether the [action] is a matter 'susceptible
to policy analysis.'M

Sea-Land Service v. United States, 919 F.2d

888, 892 (3d Cir. 1990).
Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that the traffic
separation methods themselves were discussed and debated in detail
by experienced

engineers

policy considerations.

with expertise

in weighing

competing

The traffic control plan, including the

choice of channelization method, was

initially drafted by Jim

Thompson, the project design engineer, who had over twenty years of
experience.

Swenson Deposition R. 1817:12 - 21.

In fact, Mr.

Thompson had designed the entire stretch of 1-15 from Tremonton to
the

Idaho

state

line.

Id. R.1819:16-21.

Traffic

separation

methods were also discussed with Mr. Bruce Swenson, UDOT's Region
One Design Engineer, who himself had over twenty-five years experience with UDOT, R.

1809:23-24, and who

engineer for region one since 1985.
- 1 ft-

has been

R. 1812:8-10).

the

design

In their

discussions, the two engineers discussed options such as barriers,
double yellow lines, raised curbs, "candlesticks," and vertical
panels before settling on barrels.

R. 1822:20-25, 1825:9-21.

These discussions are more than sufficient to establish that
the discretionary function immunity applies here.

UDOT notes that

discretionary function immunity is not limited to decisions made by
strictly

high-level

decision itself.

employees.

Instead,

the

focus

is on the

As the United States Supreme Court has explained,

"'It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception
applies in a given case.'" United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315,
322 (1991) (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,
813 (1984)) .
The court should also reject the plaintiffs' contention that
discretionary function immunity is not available because UDOT did
not document a high-level decision to "fail to investigate accidents" or to "fail to respond" to concerns raised by a contractor.
The simple truth is that the plaintiffs' injuries did not result
from any failure to investigate accidents or any failure to respond
to a contractor's

concerns.

Rather, the plaintiffs'

resulted from the lack of a concrete barrier.
original

use of

the barrels

as the traffic

injuries

And because the
separation method

clearly resulted from the exercise of a discretionary function, so
too did the continued

use of those barrels.
-19-

It would be ludicrous to suggest that an initial decision
would be protected by the discretionary function immunity, but the
failure to immediately correct such a decision is not. For, unless
an accident took place in the first few days after a plan went into
effect, it would be difficult to determine whether an injury
resulted from the original decision or the continuation of that
decision.

Moreover,

discretionary

function

immunity

applies

regardless of whether the discretionary function was actually performed.

In other words, UDOT obviously did not replace the barrels

with barriers.

Either a choice was made not to replace the

barrels, which would have been the exercise of a discretionary
function, or no such choice was made, in which case the injuries
allegedly arose out of the failure
function.

to exercise a discretionary

Either way, the discretionary immunity exception still

applies.
In addition, as noted above, if the function is discretionary,
then a plaintiff cannot nullify the immunity by arguing that the
decisionmaking process itself was negligent,.

Thus, even if there

was a "negligent" failure to investigate accidents, or even if
there was a negligent failure to respond to the contractor's
concerns, this still does not change the fact that barriers were
left off of the highway as a result of the exercise of UDOT's
discretion, and UDOT is therefore immune.

-20-

4.

There was no regulation requiring
barriers in the construction zone.

the use of

UDOT did not have any policy or regulation "requiring" the use
of barriers in the construction zone. The plaintiffs have asserted
that such a requirement

exists, but they have not presented

evidence of any such requirement. The closest the plaintiffs come
to an actual requirement is the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices.

But the Manual does not require the use of barriers.

Instead, the MUTCD states that in a two-way two-lane operation,
"opposing traffic shall be separated either with portable barriers
(concrete safety-shape or approved alternate), or with channelizing
devices throughout the length of the two-way operation. The use of
striping, raised pavement markers, and complementary signing,
either alone or in combination is not considered acceptable for
separation purposes."

R. 442 (emphasis added).

In other words,

the MUTCD itself leaves the final decision up to discretion of the
engineers designing the project.
Moreover, the plaintiffs' expert's opinion

that MUTCD required

barriers is not enough to defeat summary judgment. The plaintiffs
essentially are analogizing the MUTCD to a regulation binding on
UDOT. And the interpretation or application of that regulation is
a matter of law, not fact. So the mere existence of one witness's
opinion as to what the MUTCD "requires" will not raise a "genuine
issue of material fact." Furthermore, Mr. Alcorn's statement that
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the MUTCD "requires" barriers was obviously a statement of his own
interpretation as to what would be the best approach, and cannot be
taken as evidence that such a requirement is actually stated in the
manual.

Mr. Alcorn's opinion would, of course, raise a triable

issue of fact as to whether UDOT made the best choice in traffic
separation, but because of the discretionary function immunity,
that issue is moot.2

5.

An

UDOT is entitled to discretionary function immunity
because policy factors supported its decision to
use barrels.

analysis

of

the

governing

cases

demonstrates

that

discretionary function immunity does not turn on the presence of
written reports or high-level debate.

Rather, the rule to be

gleaned from Utah cases is actually fairly simple: where there are
policy reasons for choosing one course of action over another,
courts will not second-guess the agency's choice; instead, the
choice is protected by the discretionary function exception.

For

example, in Keegan the decision not to use a higher barrier was
supported by policy factors such as the higher cost of replacing

2

Also, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, David Kennison,
a UDOT engineer, most certainly did NOT testify that the factors
favored the use of barriers over barrels. Instead, he clearly and
unequivocally stated that, based on all of the considerations
present, barrels were the preferred method. Kennison Deposition,
R. 1993:1-10 ("On balance I would have recommended that they do it
just like they did it.").
-99-

the barriers, the added delays and inconvenience to drivers, and
the degree of traffic disruption.

896 P.2d at 624-25.

In Duncan,

the choice not to upgrade the railroad crossing warning device at
the intersection in question was supported by the need to install
warning devices at other dangerous crossings.

842 P. 2d at 835.

And in Rocky Mountain Thrift, the design of the flood control
system involved "geological, environmental, financial, and urban
planning and developmental concerns, and financial concerns, just
to name a few."
In

the

784 P.2d at 463.

cases

where

discretionary

function

immunity

was

rejected, however, no policy considerations supported the government entity's decision.

For example, there is no good policy

reason to leave a fence unrepaired, particularly where that fence
separates a park and the Jordan River.
919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996).

Nelson v. Salt Lake City,

Similarly, there is no reason why the

state would choose to operate an improperly synchronized traffic
signal.

Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) . And there

is no good reason not to use any
that

a

road

is

about

to

warning signs to tell a driver

disappear.

Carroll

v.

State

Road

Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).
As

set

forth above, significant

safety

reasons

supported

UDOT's decision that barrels would be the optimal method of traffic
separation in the construction area. Anyone can come back after an
accident and say that UDOT made the wrong decision, but the fact
-23-

remains that a decision had to be made.

"In essence, UDOT's

decision involved just the sort of policy-driven weighing of costs
and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to
protect."

Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624.

6.

This

The choice to use barrels
"operational" decision.

court

discretionary

can

reject

function

the

immunity

was

plaintiffs'
is

unavailable

not

merely

suggestion
because

an

that
UDOT's

decision regarding the optimal traffic separation method was merely
an operational decision, simply carrying out the "policy decision"
to reconstruct the Weber Canyon interstate.

First, UDOT notes

this sort of argument can be made about every

decision.

That is,

every policy choice can be characterized as merely the "execution"
of a higher policy.

For example, the decision to construct the

Weber Canyon interstate would obviously be considered a "policy"
decision covered by discretionary function immunity.

But that

decision could also be characterized as merely an operational decision, carrying out the state's policy of "plan[ning], develop[ing],
construct[ing], and maintain[ing] state transportation systems that
are safe, reliable, environmentally sensitive, and serve the needs
of the traveling public, commerce, and industry."
§ 63-49-4 (4) .

Utah Code Ann.

- .

Thus, the mere characterization of a decision as "carrying out
a policy" does not defeat discretionary function immunity. Rather,
-24-

the "operational" versus "policy" distinction turns on the factors
discussed earlier: whether the decision requires the evaluation of
broad policy factors.

If UDOT had let a knocked-over barrel sit in

one of the traffic lanes for eight hours, and someone was injured
as

a

result,

immunity.

That

UDOT

would

not

be

able

to

claim

discretionary

would be a merely operational matter, for there is

no good safety or other policy reason why a barrel
allowed to sit in a freeway lane for eight hours.

should be
Cf. Nelson

(decision to ignore breach in fence along Jordan River).
decision to use barrels

But the

in the first place was obviously not

operational under this analysis.
In fact, this line of reasoning points out another reason why
UDOT's position is stronger in our case than in Keegan.

For in

Keegan a compelling argument could be made that, once UDOT made the
"policy decision" to use a concrete barrier in the median, the
decision as to whether to keep that barrier in compliance with
safety standards was merely ministerial.

UDOT's failure to raise

those barriers after the overlay projects could easily be seen
simply as an operational decision carrying out the already-imposed
policy to have a barrier.

But the decision not to raise the

barriers was held to be discretionary in Keegan, and the choice
whether to use

barriers is discretionary in our case as well.

-25-

C.

Because UDOT is immune from suit under the discretionary
function exception it is irrelevant whether UDOT made
the "right" choice regarding the barrels.

If the act is the type that implicates the exercise of basic
policy evaluation, judgment and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency, it qualifies as a discretionary function. The
plaintiffs essentially argue that UDOT made the "wrong" choice, but
any such suggestions are irrelevant. Of course, UDOT disputes that
it made the wrong choice as to the traffic separation method.

It

is terrible that the plaintiffs were involved in such a serious
accident, but as discussed earlier, using barriers would have
created a whole new set of accidents, probably even more of them,
and they could have been just as tragic.

But ultimately it is

irrelevant whether UDOT's decision was correct, for the discretionary function immunity applies either way.

Discretionary function

immunity would have little meaning if it only applied when the
agency made a "correct" choice, for presumably the correct choice
would be nonactionable anyway.

And, the statute clearly provides

that the discretionary function immunity applies "whether or not
the discretion is abused."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1).

Highways are dangerous. And highways under construction are
even more dangerous, no matter how the construction is done. UDOT
was faced with a choice between two evils: the evils presented by
the use of concrete barriers, or the evils presented by the absence
of concrete barriers. Either way, there would be dangers; the only
-26-

way to make a truly "safe" choice would be to close the freeway
entirely.3
a choice:

UDOT and its employees weighed those dangers and made
no barriers.

The plaintiffs are understandably unhappy

about that choice, but they cannot reasonably deny that a tough
choice had to be made.
The purpose of discretionary function immunity is to allow a
government

entity

to weigh

competing

policies

and make

choices without being second-guessed by the judicial system.
e.g. , Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623.

tough
See,

In this case, if UDOT had chosen to

use barriers, a Keegan-type accident could easily have occurred,
and UDOT would likely have been sued for that choice.

The Govern-

mental Immunity Act and the case law interpreting it makes clear
that choices in highway design are best left up to the Department
of Transportation, and not to juries.

Therefore, the trial court

correctly granted summary judg*^rit in favor of UDOT on the issue of
the discretionary function immunitv.

POINT TWO
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEIR INJURIES RESULTED
FROM UDOT•S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REDUCE THE SPEED LIMITS IN
THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE.
Summary judgment was also proper on the plaintiffs' claim that

3

But as the 1-15 construction project demonstrates, even that
choice would not be safe, because additional traffic would be
forced onto other roads and cause more accidents that way.
-97-

UDOT is liable for allegedly failing to reduce the speed limit in
the canyon. First, setting a speed limit is itself a discretionary
function, as it, too, requires the balancing of several factors.
More importantly, however, there is absolutely no evidence that the
plaintiffs' injuries resulted from UDOT's alleged failure to reduce
the speed limit.

The plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable

inferences in their favor, of course, but those inferences have to
be based on some evidence.

The only evidence cited by the plain-

tiffs is the deposition testimony of Mr. Thomas Alcorn, their
expert witness. But Mr. Alcorn never stated that the accident was
caused by the failure to change the speed limit signs. Mr. Alcorn
testified as follows:
Q:
Okay, do you have any information that would
indicate that speed had anything to do with, and I'm not
talking about the injuries, but I'm talking about the
cause of the accident?
A:
Well, certainly it appears that you have a loss
of control on the outside of a horizontal curve to the
left, which is an indicator of speed too fast for
conditions followed by an overcorrection to the left.
Q:
Do you know whether or not that loss of control
was due to speed or some other factor such as
intoxication, fatigue or inattentiveness?
A:

I can't tell you how many factors were in it,

no.
Q:
You have no way to really determine what caused
the truck driver to veer off to the right?
Mr. Ferguson:

Truck driver?

Q: (By Mr. Williams) The pickup truck driver, Mr.
-2R-

Griffin.
A:

No, I don't.

Q:
In fact, you would merely be speculating,
wouldn't you, at this point that speed was one of the
factors that caused him to drive off the shoulder in the
road prior to the accident occurring?
A:
A little more than speculation.
It's very
characteristic on our highways throughout the country as
a causal factor in single vehicle, run-off-the-road
accidents on the outside of a curve.
Q:

But you're making a general statement, correct?

A:

Yes.

Q:
And it's not based on any particular facts or
investigation of this case?
A:

I agree.

Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, R. 2269:4 - 2270:10 (emphasis added).
In other words, Mr. Alcorn himself admitted that he had no way
to determine what caused Griffin to veer off to the right and to go
out of control. He also admitted that while speed may be a causal
factor in single-car run-off-the-road accidents on curves, he could
not say that it actually was in this case. It may have been speed,
or it may have been something else, such as intoxication, fatigue,
or inattentiveness. And any opinions he did render were "not based
on any particular facts or investigation of this case."

If an

expert admits that his opinion is "basically speculation," the
court is justified in disregarding the expert's opinion. See e.g.
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996); State v.
-29-

Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980) ("the general rule regarding
the certainty of an expert's opinion is that the expert may not
give an opinion which represents a mere guess, speculation, or
conjecture.")
Moreover, even if there had been evidence that speed was a
"factor,"

there was no evidence

that

the driver was

actually

driving at an unsafe speed, or that his speed was in any way
related to what the speed limit signs said.

Thus, it would be pure

speculation to suggest that UDOT's alleged failure to reduce the
speed limit proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries.

Summary

judgment was therefore proper on this theory of recovery as well.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

set

forth

above, defendant-appellee

UDOT

hereby requests the court to affirm the summary judgment of the
trial court dismissing UDOT with prejudice and upon the merits.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMMITTED this 26th day of June, 1998.
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Mark J. Williams
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